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Integration in the East African Community offers 
significant opportunities not only to expand trade 
among member states, but more importantly to scale 
up regional production to take advantage of much 
larger global market opportunities. Special economic 
zones are a potentially valuable instrument to facilitate 
the integration of regional value chains in support 
of this scaling up. They also have the potential to 
deliver powerful demonstration effects on the benefits 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at adobronogov@worldbank.org and tfarole@worldbank.org.  
of integration and to help entrench the integration 
process. This paper discusses the proposal for developing 
an “economic integration zone” in the East African 
Community. The benefits of such a zone could be 
substantial, as would be the practical challenges to 
implementation—in particular the political economy 
challenges. However, a number of institutional and 
commercial solutions exist to address these challenges. 1 
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§ World Bank, tfarole@worldbank.org 1.  EAC integration and the potential for scaling up regional production 
The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) was signed by the governments of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in Arusha, Tanzania in November of 1999
3, and came into force in July, 
2000, at which time the regional  secretariat of the East African Community was formed.  Burundi and 
Rwanda joined in 2007. The EAC aims at deep economic, social, and political integration, starting with a 
customs union and moving on to a common market, a monetary union, and ultimately a political 
federation among the five member states. It seeks to achieve these goals by laying down common rules 
governing, inter alia, trade in goods and services; cross-border investment; mobility of natural/legal 
persons;  infrastructure  development  and  maintenance;  environmental  and  natural  resource 
management; tourism; and regional industrial development, including industrial parks and SEZs.  
 
Significant progress has been made in the implementation of regional integration. Most notably, the 
customs union was launched in 2004
4and as of January 2010 all internal tariffs, surcharges, and excise 
taxes  were removed for intra -regional trade, establishing a single market for goods and services. 
However, practical implementation of these  and other ambitious integration  arrangements  faces 
numerous practical and, most importantly, political challenges. For example, such issues as permanent 
residency and the right of access to and use of land  remain subject to national policies (thus in effect 
restricting mobility of labor and capital) rather than being a part  of the common market protocol. 
Moreover, the community’s plans for monetary union by 2012 are unlikely to be implemented given the 
current state of preparations.  
 
Thus the path to political federation remains a difficult one. On the other hand, economic integration 
through trade and investment is leading the way. Since the advent of the single customs territory, trade 
and investment in the region has grown strongly, both in terms of intra-regional flows and also with 
respect to global markets. As illustrated in Figure 1, exports from the region have grown rapidly; since 
2005 total EAC exports have increased more than 15% per annum, with intra-regional trade growing 
19% per year. Intra-regional trade rose from about 15% of total EAC exports in 2000 to more than 20% 










                                                           
3 This treaty effectively re-established the EAC, which was originally set up in 1967 but disbanded in 1977. 
4 Through the EAC Customs Management Act, which implemented the EAC Customs Union Protocol 3 
 
Figure 1: EAC exports and intra-regional trade 
 
Source: UN Comtrade via WITS 
 
But as most East African countries are relatively small – and even in its larger economies, domestic 
market size is constrained by low income levels – regional trade has limits in its potential to drive 
growth. Complementarity of production also restricts the scope of intra-regional trade at the moment. 
Rather, exploiting the much larger global opportunities will be the key to sustained export and economic 
growth. Despite the significant growth of exports from the EAC in recent years, the region’s share of the 
world market for exports remains well below 0.1%, around half the global average on a per capita basis.  
 
In fact, global market integration and regional integration are not alternative strategies, but rather 
complementary ones. Increasing the global exports of individual member states requires improving the 
competitiveness of its firms. One of the key mechanisms through which to improve competitiveness is 
through scaling up regional production – i.e. integrating regional value chains to allow firms to reap the 
advantages of greater specialization and scale. Successful integration of regional value chains will not 
only facilitate exports to global markets but, by definition, will result in greater inter-regional trade 
through  increased  task  or  component-based  trade.  Indeed,  this  process  of  regional  integration  of 
production is being supported through the EAC Industrialization Strategy
5. At the moment, however, 
integration of production networks within the EAC is extremely limited. Figure 2 shows that while intra-
industry trade (IIT) – a proxy for integration of manufacturing networks – within the EAC is higher than 
within other regions in Africa or in South Asia, it remains dramatically lower than through East Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas. In the case of ASEAN
6, for example, the removal of formal and informal trade 
barriers resulted in the spreading of value chains across the regions, with most countries benefitting by 
specializing in the production of various components of complex goods that were shifted across the 
region in various stages of production. 
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Figure 2: Intra-regional intra-industry trade (Grubel-Lloyd index, 2008) 
 
Source: Brulhart (2009) 
 
According to research by World Bank (2010), if the scale economies of the East African Common Market 
are fully realized, the exports of goods and services would grow from US$12 to US$20 billion over the 
next decade, contributing to a doubling of formal employment and GNI per capita. While intra-regional 
trade has significant growth potential, clearly the majority of this export growth will need to come from 
global markets. As suggested above, regional integration is complementary with the aims of promoting 
competitiveness and growth in global markets. 
 
However, while this combination of regional and global integration should contribute to faster growth 
EAC-wide, its effects will not be felt evenly across the region. As goods, capital, and labor markets open 
up in the EAC, economic activity is likely to concentrate increasingly in a few key areas where scale and 
access to global markets can be best exploited. Unlike in the ASEAN case, the unique geography of the 
EAC (3 of its 5 member states and 40% of its population is landlocked) is likely to restrict the spread 
effect of integration, resulting in higher concentration of economic activity. As discussed in the World 
Development  Report  2009  (World  Bank,  2008),  such  processes  of  agglomeration  and  therefore 
geographically unbalanced growth is inevitable and for the most part growth supporting. The challenge 
in the EAC context is to use the regional integration process to facilitate broad access of workers, firms, 
and finance to the fast growing agglomerations, while at the same time opening up more peripheral 
regions to investment and expertise to enable them to take advantage of opportunities that may be 
available for producing goods and services within regional value chains. But when the perception of 
winners and losers from agglomeration extends across national borders, the political implications can 




































2.  The role of Special Economic Zones 
Accepting that agglomeration is both necessary and desired to achieve the benefits of regional scale, the 
question is how these processes can be best facilitated. The customs union and the wider processes of 
integration within the EAC should help overcome barriers to agglomeration caused by trade policies, 
border-related issues, investment, and the free movement of labor. But even assuming these processes 
are efficient, a number of barriers still remain. These include: 
  Lack of reliable infrastructure, in particular transport, power, and telecommunications; 
  Difficulty in accessing serviced industrial land and slow, cumbersome processes to secure it; 
  Red tape and slow decision making relating to licenses, permits, and other aspects of starting 
and operating a business; and 
  Information failures that prevent the private sector from coordinating investment activity. 
 
One instrument used internationally to overcome such barriers to investment and agglomeration is 
special economic zones (SEZs). Special economic zones are spatially delimited areas within an economy 
that function with administrative, regulatory, and often fiscal regimes that are different (typically more 
liberal) from those of the domestic economy. Operating through a variety of different forms such as 
“export processing zones”, “economic processing zones”, “free zones”, and “foreign trade zones”, SEZs 
aim to overcome barriers that hinder investment in the wider economy, including restrictive policies, 
poor  governance,  inadequate  infrastructure,  and  problematic  access  to  land.  SEZs  have  been  an 
important  policy  instrument  for many  governments  seeking to  attract  foreign  investment,  promote 
export-oriented  growth,  and  generate  employment.  Their  popularity  as  a  policy  tool  has  grown 
enormously in the past 20 years – in 1986, ILO’s database reported 176 zones in 47 countries. By 2006 it 
reported 3,500 zones in 130 countries (Boyenge, 2007). 
 
While there is a long history of failure around the world in using instruments like SEZs to promote 
investment in remote regions, the evidence suggests they can be highly effective when targeting regions 
that  already  have  natural  or  economic  geography  advantages  (World  Bank,  2008).  While  SEZs  are 
unlikely to be a trigger for agglomeration in lagging regions with low population densities, in places like 
China,  where  SEZs targeted  coastal  trade  gateways,  they  have  proven  to  be  powerful  catalysts  for 
growth. Thus, while the World Bank’s World Development Report 2009 (World Bank, 2008) suggests 
SEZs be approached cautiously, it supports the use of such hard and soft infrastructure to reinforce 
existing geographical advantages. 
 
And so by leveraging agglomeration, SEZs have the potential to play a role in harnessing integration 
processes to support regional competitiveness. In an open regional integration context, SEZs may serve 
as regional public goods (see Box 1), as they may have significant spillover effects across the region – 






Box 1: Regional public goods 
A regional public good (RPG) is a service or resource whose benefits are shared by neighboring countries (the 
countries  within  the  region).  The  benefits  of  pure  regional  public  goods  are  “non-rival”  (one  country’s 
consumption does not subtract from the amount available to other countries) and “nonexcludable” (no 
country in the region can be excluded from benefiting, except at prohibitive cost). In reality, most RPGs are 
significantly,  but  not  wholly,  non-rival  and  non-excludable.  Rather  than  being  “pure,”  they  are  “mixed,” 
meaning that they bestow a combination of national and transnational benefits
7. 
 
Three kinds of activities to pursue RPGs can be distinguished: 
1. Non-country specific investments in knowledge, dialogue, basic research into technologies meant to be in 
the public domain (for example, vaccines) and negotiation of agreement on shared standards and policy 
regimes. 
2. Inter-country mechanisms for managing adverse cross-border externalities or creating beneficial ones – 
e.g.,  coordinated  public  health  measures  to  contain  the  spread  of  disease;  investments  in  cross-border 
infrastructure to enhance the preconditions for growth through trade and integration among participating 
countries; creation of regional institutions to facilitate solutions in areas ranging from financial and banking 
stability to the sustainable management of shared environmental resources.  
3. Country-specific action to take advantage (or enable absorption) of the benefits created by the two means 
above.  This  will  create  national  public  goods  such  as  improved  policy  environments  and  institutional 
indicators. In turn, these can engender transnational externalities. 
 
Source: Adapted from Kanbur  in Ferroni (2002) 
 
First, by concentrating core infrastructure around zones and addressing the constraints discussed above, 
zones reinforce processes of agglomeration and help industries to reach scale thresholds that will allow 
them to compete more effectively in regional and global markets. The benefits of creating competitive 
conditions for private sector development and an efficient trade gateway at the core will, however, spill 
well beyond the firms based in the zones to include firms through the regional supply chains that feed 
into them. Thus, SEZs benefits should extend well beyond the core.  Second, SEZs may offer sector-
specific public goods, such as warehousing and logistics platforms, shared processing facilities, design 
centers, etc., that facilitate competitiveness of wider industry clusters in the region
8. Third, they have 
the potential to serve as pilots for broader economic reforms in the region. The most well-known case of 
this is in China, where SEZs were used explicitly as a “testing ground” for major economic reforms. The 
public good here stems primarily from the demonstration effect that such zones can have on the wider 
national environment (and eventually on economic efficiency)
9. Finally, in the EAC context, the use of 
SEZs  on  a  region -wide  level  has  the  potential  to  facilitate  institutional  convergence  both  by 
demonstration effects and through greater interaction among policymakers and technical officials across 
member states. 
                                                           
7 The usual definition of the characteristics of “publicness” of public goods involves individuals as the relevant 
units. However, in the discussion of international public goods, countries, not individuals, are taken as the relevant 
units 
8 Note these are not strictly public goods but rather “club goods”; they are excludable but generally non-rivalrous. 
9 This is, of course, more difficult in a regional context than in a national one, due to the differing legal and political 
contexts across states. 7 
 
 
A commercially-focused SEZ designed at the regional level also has the potential to play an important 
part  in  addressing  the  political  economy  concerns  resulting  from  the  agglomeration  processes.  If 
implemented effectively and in the context of truly open labor, capital, and goods markets, such a zone 
could help ensure that some of the benefits of agglomeration are enjoyed by all countries in the region. 
Moreover, it could be designed to ensure that these benefits were distributed as evenly as possible 
across member states, through the distribution of revenue streams and other benefits arising from the 
zone. Thus a regional SEZ may offer a politically expedient and practical way of piloting federation, 
allowing each member state to test how processes of federation may play out within a tightly defined 
commercial ”pilot”, in advance of committing itself on an economy wide basis. This is the concept of an 
Economic Integration Zone (EIZ) for the EAC. 
 
 
3.  Introduction to the EIZ 
The “East African Economic Integration Zone” (EIZ) is conceived as a special economic zone located near 
EAC’s economic “core”. This would most likely be based around a commonly-operated port on the coast 
and in close proximity to one of the areas in the region with high concentration of economic activity.  
The zone would be administered through a multi-level governance structure, with an autonomous local 
administration overseen by a regional supranational body. Investment, as well as taxes and revenues 
would be shared among the members. Its objective is to promote regional competitiveness directly 
(through the channels discussed above) as well as by providing demonstration effects not only on how 
to create a competitive investment climate, but more broadly on the potential benefits of key provisions 
of integration, including labor and capital mobility. 
 
The EIZ could be designed broadly in line with the “wide area” SEZs usually associated with the Chinese 
model  –  i.e.  occupying  a  surface  area  greater  than  10,000  hectares  (100  km
2),  with  mixed-use 
developments  (including  industrial,  commercial,  and  real  estate),  and  normally  with  a  resident 
population. As such it would effectively function as a new city or municipality. In this sense the EIZ bears 
similarity to two recent concepts proposed by academics – of “charter cities” (Romer, 2010) and “early 
reform zones” (Auty, 2010): 
  Charter cities are born from the observation that bad rules and bad enforcement of rules is one 
of the most critical factors holding back growth in many developing countries. Inspired by the 
success of colonial trade hubs like Hong Kong SAR, China and, more recently, China’s SEZs, they 
aim to use unoccupied land as a chance to establish a new city that operates outside the existing 
arrangements of the country, establishing their own tax regimes and legal structures. Under the 
concept, countries can act as host, source and guarantor. The host country provides the land, 
source  countries  provide  the  residents,  and  guarantor  countries  ensure  that  the  charter  is 
enforced. Honduras recently voted a constitutional amendment to allow for the creation of 
charter cities in the country (see Box 2). 
  Early Reform Zones ERZs are geographical areas located within distorted economies,  where 8 
 
post-reform conditions (comprising: world class infrastructure; business-friendly services; and 
property rights and the rule of law) exist. The ERZ is executed as part of an economy-wide dual 
track strategy, whereby ERZs are used to kick-start a dynamic market economy, which forms 
Track 1 and rapidly expands employment, skills, taxes and exports. Track 1 also builds a pro-
reform political coalition that can eventually take on opponents of reform and neutralize and/or 
co-opt them. Meanwhile, reform proceeds slowly in the rent distorted sector (Track 2) in order 
to avoid early confrontation with rent seekers, which a reforming government is likely to lose. 
Successful dual track economic reform in economies as diverse as Mauritius, Malaysia and China 
shows  that  SEZs  can  grow  a  dynamic  market  economy  within  fifteen  years  to  a  scale  that 
dominates the total economy. 
   
Box 2: Charter cities in Honduras 
In  2011,  the  Honduran  National  Congress  passed  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  that  gives  the 
government the power to create special development regions (known by their acronym in Spanish, REDs). 
The REDs would be a independent jurisdiction, with its own laws and administrative systems. Laws developed 
by the governing authority of the RED, however, must be ratified by the Honduran Congress with a simple 
majority. 
 
The establishment of any region as an RED would require enabling legislation that must be supported by a 
two-thirds vote in Congress. Subsequent to this, Congress can change the enabling legislation and two-thirds 
majority and approval by referendum from the citizens living in the RED. 
 
The President of Honduras has set aside 1,000 square kilometers in a yet-to-be defined location for the 
development of the charter city. 
 
Source: Adapted from http://chartercities.org/blog/191/a-new-city-in-honduras  
 
In the EAC context, it may not be necessary to develop an EIZ on the scale Romer proposes (population 
of around 10 million). However, it will almost certainly be necessary to have a city of some size not only 
for practical reasons such as housing of workers, but also for commercial and political reasons, such as 
ensuring a significant tax base to compel interest and commitment on the part of EAC members. 
 
In line with the concept of SEZs, a critical characteristic of the EIZ would be its extra-territorial nature. 
Almost all SEZs operate under a different fiscal and legal framework than exists in the national economy 
in critical areas like the  tax regime, rules on foreign currency, and sometimes labor law. Many also 
operate outside of the control of the municipal government authorities in the locality in which they are 
based. But the EIZ would differ from traditional SEZs in two critical ways. First and foremost is its 
regional nature. Because it is designed as a “regional space” and may indeed straddle two more existing 
countries, no single nation-state would be act as its natural sovereign. Second, and following from this, 
there is potential (and perhaps need) to operate the EIZ under a distinct legal, regulatory and fiscal 
regime that would differ further in scope than would normally be the case in an SEZ. In this sense, the 9 
 
EIZ is unique – we are aware of no other such regional SEZ currently operating
10 – and potentially very 
much in line with the charter cities proposals. 
 
The extra-territorial nature of charter cities does not simply allow the city to operate under a new set of 
rules. Of equal importance is the way in which those rules are interpreted and enforced – i.e. it is about 
governance. As Romer argues, if the whole point about the charter cities is to get around a system of 
rules that has failed, it will not be sufficient to simply establish a new set of rules outside the old borders 
and govern it by the same individuals and institutions. Therefore, what is critical to the charter city 
model is not just that it sits outside the traditional borders but also that it sits outside the traditional 
governance  structures  of  the  country  in  which  it  is  physically  located.  In  the  charter  city  model, 
sovereignty of the city would come under some sort of third party “guarantor” – i.e. a country respected 
for  good  governance  (e.g.  Mauritius)  or  some  other  credible  third  party  (e.g.  an  international 
organization) would have control over the zone at least for a defined time period, in order to guarantee 
that the necessary governance reforms were institutionalized.  
 
So in this sense, in adopting the charter city approach to extra-territoriality, the concept of an EIZ for 
East Africa requires a significant departure from traditional modes of governance. But it is likely to be 
critical to the success of the EIZ. This is not because of problems with governance in Kenya, Tanzania or 
any of the EAC states per se, but rather for the political economy of dealing with a zone that is intended 
to serve the region rather than an individual country. Whether or not the EIZ would actually require 
external governance through, for example, a “guarantor” is unclear. Would collective participation by 
East African states, under a supranational body like the EAC, be enough to ensure its credibility? 
 
 
4.  The challenge of “credible commitment” 
While the EIZ is an appealing concept through which to test federation, its regional nature aggravates 
some  of  the  already-difficult  challenges  faced  in  implementation  an  SEZ,  as  political  economy 
considerations come to the fore. First is the challenge of convincing the host government(s) to give up 
control over the land on which the EIZ would be based, and to maintain this detachment over time. 
Establishing a territory as a separate jurisdiction requires careful consideration and often much political 
compromise within a country. But when one or more states are required to give up control of their 
sovereign  territory  to  a  collective or  supranational  authority,  these  political  considerations  become 
acute. As mentioned previously, we are aware of no precedent of a truly trans-national special economic 
zone, especially not one in which a country voluntarily gave up control over a portion of its land.
11 But 
                                                           
10 There are attempts at harmonizing SEZ regimes at the regional level, such as the ongoing efforts in the East 
African Community. There have also been attempts to coordinate SEZ development regionally, such as the BIMP-
EAGA Growth Triangle in Southeast Asia. But none of these actually involve zones that are governed on a regional 
or cross-national basis. 
11 Although there are of course precedents like China’s leasing of Hong Kong SAR, China and many examples where 
long-term leases are given to other sovereign states to operate large military bases – for example the US in 
Okinawa, Japan; Stuttgart, Germany; and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 10 
 
assuming the political will, the potential benefits to a host country should be sufficient to facilitate an 
arrangement on the land for an EIZ (see a discussion in the next section). Moreover, in the EAC context, 
this may be somewhat easier to overcome, as the member states have already agreed to gradually cede 
portions of their sovereignty to the Community. 
 
Perhaps the bigger challenge, however, is in maintaining the commitment of the host government(s) 
and other partners over the long term. This is the challenge of managing the investment risk – or the 
issue of “credible commitment” (see Box 3). But how do governments – particularly those in developing 
countries – show a credible commitment to potential investors? Part of the answer lies in having a track 
record of policy stability. Unstable political regimes are inherently more risky, because the shorter time 
horizon raises the incentive for confiscate (nationalize) assets (North, 1994), or to undertake radical 
policy  shifts.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  this  respect  what  matters  is  the  stability  of  the  polity,  not 
necessarily  whether  or  not  it  is  democratic.  Indeed,  a  stable  autocracy  can  in  many  cases  offer 
commitment (at least in the medium term) that is more credible than what a democracy can offer. 
Growing democracy in the presence of still-weak institutions and the emergence of political competition 
can make enforcing the commitments of previous policies particularly tricky. This is the situation  in 
many low income and African countries today. Within the EAC, Kenya’s experience in recent years may 
be seen as a good example of these difficulties. 
 
The  issue  of  credible  commitment  is  particularly  critical  for  developers  and  investors  in  zone 
infrastructure,  with  longer-term  payoff  horizons.  However,  it  also  impacts  the  perception  of  the 
individual firms that would invest in operations in the EIZ. While these investments would be smaller 
and more likely to have shorter-term payoffs, they would still factor any perceived additional risk in the 
fact that the project may be deemed to be on less stable ground than a traditional SEZ project backed by 
a single sovereign. Thus, the higher the risk perceived by potential investors, the less likely they will be 

















Box 3: Credible commitment, investment risk, and the obsolescence bargain 
The concept of credible commitment is essentially one of trust: how sure can two parties in an economic exchange 
be confident of the trustworthiness of the other in maintaining their side of the bargain? The basic problem and 
solution  of  credible  commitment  can  be  simply  explained  through  game  theory,  as  North  (1994.  p.2)  notes: 
“players can be bound when the gains from living up to an agreement exceed the gains from defecting”. But in the 
absence of knowledge of one party’s trustworthiness, the other party faces a situation of increased risk, raising 
transactions costs (through the risk premium on the investment and the need to  increase  monitoring of the 
contract), restricting investment at the margin. Trustworthiness or “credibility” of commitment is relevant not only 
with respect to transactions between private parties, but also, and critically, with respect to government as one of 
the  parties  or  stakeholders.  The  concept  of  credible  commitment  can  be  invoked  across  many  aspects  of 
government policy. Indeed, it has had renewed interest recently in the light of the global economic crisis and the 
implications of the credibility of government policies on the integrity of the financial system.  
 
In the context of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), the ability to make credible commitments to potential 
investors is an important source of competitive advantage. The challenge is how to convince investors
12 to make 
investments with long-term payoffs without concern that the investment climate under which they made the 
investments will change. This concern over the security of the investment climate can be as stark as one over 
whether or not the state will nationalize or otherwise expropriate the assets of the private investor. But in reality 
these wholesale appropriations are the exception. The significant risk is more prosaic – that the government will 
enact policies that change the risk/return nexus; cumulatively a series of such policies will ultimately make the 
financial case unfeasible. This is what Romer (2010b) refers to as the “death by a thousand small cuts.” 
 
Investors making the type of large-scale, fixed cost investments in infrastructure and zone development that are 
critical to the success of the EIZ – i.e. zone developers and sub-developers – face greater commitment challenges 
due to what is known as the “obsolescence bargain” (Vernon, 1971). Essentially this argues that in industries 
requiring large, up-front investments with a stream of future revenues generated into the long term, power lies in 
the hands of the investor up until they commit the investment (which explains why investors in these sectors are 
often courted with significant incentives.) But once these investments are made, the balance of power shifts as 
investors are left exposed to high sunk costs, leaving the government with significant incentives to renege on their 
commitments.  This  may  not  mean  wholesale  nationalization  or  expropriation,  but  it  often  means  smaller 
measures, such as levies and “windfall” taxes, to capture a share of the rents. 
 
Investors will offset the perceived increased risk by attempting either to reduce their potential losses (by asking for 
large subsidies) or by aiming to recover their rents as quickly as possible. The first of these is problematic from an 
economic cost-benefit perspective. Indeed, it is the large infrastructure requirements in the first place that make 
public provision infeasible in most countries, and therefore the need for the private sector to absorb some of the 
risk. But there is enough project risk anyway to not have the additional cost of having to subsidize policy risk. The 
latter may not be viable in the SEZ situation as the main way for the developer to front-load returns is to charge 
high  costs  for  land  and  facilities  and  high  fees  for  services.  This  is  unlikely  to  be  feasible,  particularly  in  a 
developing country context, as individual project investors are likely to be price sensitive on land and facility costs. 
Another option would be to require upfront payment for the full period of the land lease. In Malaysia, for example, 
the Penang Development Corporation required upfront payment on the full 60-year land lease period in their EPZs 
in order to generate cash flow to fund infrastructure investments
 13.  
                                                           
12 In the case of the EIZ, in addition to investors we must also consider the implications of credible commitment 
with respect to the workers and general population that would be attracted to move to or work in the EIZ. While 
these workers essentially “opt-in” (to use the language of charter cities), they clearly face risks and costs (both real 
and opportunity costs) in moving into the zone. Like any investor, they will also consider the viability of the regime 
and weigh the perceived risk/return payoff. 
13 Whether investors would be willing to consider such upfront payments in the context of investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa is another questions 12 
 
The risks to commitment that the EIZ would face are three-fold. First, is the risk of the host country or 
countries  reneging  on  their  EIZ  commitments  –  i.e.  reverting  on  their  commitment  to  give  up 
sovereignty over the zone (fully or potentially over certain aspects like revenue collection, security, etc.) 
or putting up barriers to the interaction between the zone and the national economy. One can imagine a 
number of reasons why this might happen. Some of the most likely triggers would be political, social and 
economic issues within the host country, including fiscal crisis, economic or political nationalism, and 
elections and subsequent policy instability. In the recent research by Wellhausen (2010), 57% of the 412 
arbitration and expropriation events in a global FDI database between 1970 and 2009 took place in or 
preceding an election year. One need only look at some of the situations that have impacted EAC 
countries in recent years, including the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-2008 and to a far lesser 
degree the constitutional referendum in Uganda in 2005. One can also imagine a scenario where natural 
resources were found in or near the EIZ location and the implications this might have on commitment of 
the host government to share revenues from the zone. Finally, the success of the zone itself might raise 
(or equally reduce) the incentive of the host government to renege on the agreement in an effort to 
capture more rents or reduce liabilities. 
 
The second risk is that other EAC members renege on their own commitments to the EIZ. Most likely this 
would  occur  with  regard  to  commitments  to  support  some  infrastructure  expenditure,  to  commit 
necessary funds to operational budget or to deliver effectively on their responsibilities for managing 
certain aspects of zone governance. One of the most likely reasons for this would be if member states 
(particularly those that did not host the zone) felt they were not getting sufficient benefit from it. The 
main  concern  here  is  the  distribution  of  gains  –  i.e.  the  fact  that  the  EIZ  will  contribute  to  a 
concentration  of  investment  and  economic  activity,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  in  the  country  or 
countries in which it is based, with the perception (if not necessarily reality) that it would actually 
detract  from  investment  that  otherwise  might  have  been  made  in  other  member  countries.  Other 
member countries may feel they could enjoy greater benefits by, for example, setting up a competing 
economic zone (perhaps with a more generous set of fiscal incentives) outside the EIZ. This raises the 
importance of any agreements made with respect to competition between the EIZ and other existing or 
future SEZs in the region. In the absence of a clear agreement among EAC member states on the 
existence of other SEZs in the context of the EIZ and, perhaps more importantly, on the nature of the 
incentives that can be provided within zones, this presents a potentially serious risk to zone investors 
(developers). For example, in the early years following the agreement to establish the Singapore-Suzhou 
Industrial Park (SIP)
14, the local government in Suzhou opened a competing industrial park in close 
proximity to SIP and with much lower land prices. This was one of severa l factors which dramatically 
impacted the economic returns of the project. 
 
Finally, there is the risk of the wider breakdown of the EAC and the implications this would have for the 
EIZ. Should the zone be developed explicitly within the context of the EAC  (e.g. with EAC institutions 
being involved in the board or in operational management, or with aspects of the EIZ Law being 
dependent on EAC Law or regulations), the EIZ  might be undermined in the event of the dissolution of 
                                                           
14 A joint venture between the Chinese and Singaporean governments 13 
 
the EAC. Even if the EIZ is not set up explicitly within an EAC institutional framework, the political fallout 
from the breakdown of the EAC would raise the risk of either the host country or one of the other 
members  reneging  on  its  commitments.  The  perception  by  investors  of  the  likelihood  of  such 
breakdown must not be considered remote, given the history of the EAC,
15 and the overlapping nature 
of  Africa’s  regional  agreements.  On  the  other  hand,  if  even  the  dissolution  of  the  EAC  would  not 
necessarily  bring  the  EIZ  down  with  it,  if  member  countries  find  it  to  be  a  useful  instrument.  For 
example,  the  East  African  Development  Bank  survived  the  previous  collapse  of  the  EAC  and  has 
operated continuously for more than 40 years, because the leaders of the three member states found it 
to be in their interests to maintain it
16.  
 
On the other hand, regimes can be “bound together” through regional agreements like the EAC. If the 
EAC  is  delivering  real  benefits,  reneging  on  EIZ  commitments  could  have  severe  implications  for 
members, either the risk of breakdown of the EAC or some sort of sanction within it. The experience of 
the EU, for example, shows that regional agreements can also be an effective disciplining force to lock a 
party (country) into economic or political reforms. Two main conditions are necessary in order for a 
regional trade and investment agreement or wider regional integration arrangement to serve as an 
effective  commitment  mechanism  (see  Box  4),  in  particular:  (i)  that  the  benefit  of  continued 
membership is greater than the immediate gains of exit / returning to alternative policies; and (ii) that 
the regional agreement has a credible punishment threat against a country that reneges. If the cost of 
exit from the agreement is low and/or implementing the rules and administering punishments is weak, 
the regional arrangement is unlikely to be effective in ensuring commitment. The ongoing Euro area 
crisis and its links with the inability of the EU to enforce agreements over fiscal discipline provide a 















                                                           
15 The EAC was initially established in 1967 and dissolved in 1977, mainly over political disagreements between Idi 
Amin of Uganda and Presidents Kenyatta and Nyerere 
16 Specifically, they were concerned about the possibility of significant capital outflows should the bank be 
dismantled. 14 
 
Box 4: Assessment of the factors required for effective regional cooperation 
First, the duration and depth of regional cooperation must be sufficient to make meaningful improvements 
possible.  Concluding  a  trade  agreement  is  one  thing,  but  persisting  in  the  difficult  effort  of  deepening 
integration is quite another. Deepening is likely to be needed in order to consolidate benefits over time, but 
it is also expected to call for contentious structural change. Meaningful regional cooperation requires long-
term commitments and a willingness to go into adequate depth on the part of those involved. Depth has to 
do with the complementary national measures needed to enable countries to contribute to, and absorb, the 
benefits  of  transnational  cooperation  (see  below).  This  is  the  hard  part,  more  difficult  than  signing  an 
international  agreement  and  rhetorically  committing  to  the  course  of  action  that  it  implies.  Regional 
cooperation consists of national measures taken in accordance with some agreed international plan. The 
absence of, or lags in, complementary national measures can bring the best collective action framework to 
naught. 
 
Second, in the interest of sustainability, losers (or countries that gain less than others from cooperation in 
a given field) must be compensated to keep the coalition of actors and the pursuit of cooperative solutions 
alive. Again, this can be very difficult because of the possibility of disagreement over the nature and extent of 
asymmetries and because of resource constraints. 
 
Third, contracting parties should bind themselves with treaties or agreements that are self enforcing, 
where this is feasible, because of the absence of supranational authorities capable of exacting compliance. 
Barrett (2002) shows that the requirement of self-enforcement reduces the number of feasible cooperative 
solutions. 
 
Source: Adapted from Ferroni (2002) 
 
 
5.  Addressing commitment challenges in the EIZ 
The distribution of benefits from the EIZ 
Before outlining possible solutions to commitment, we first summarize the benefits that are expected to 
flow from the EIZ, and to which groups these benefits are likely to accrue. It is only from understanding 
the relative winners and losers from a project like the EIZ that one can begin to consider the fiscal and 
institutional solutions by which to reach compromise. 
 
In Section 2 we outlined some of the benefits that may be created by SEZs, particularly operating in a 
regional context. Table 1 summarizes these benefit streams and identifies how they are likely to be 
distributed, particularly across space in the region. Two things become clear from this brief assessment. 
First, the core will benefit more than the periphery (and to some degree at its expense) in terms of 
investment  and  trade  flows,  at  least  in  the  short  term.  This  highlights  the  importance  of  the 
redistributional potential of the EIZ and the need to ensure that solutions are found to facilitate short-
term employment gains for nationals from the landlocked states. Second, that within the core of the 
EAC, the state(s) in which the EIZ is based will benefit disproportionally. This is good news from the 





Table 1: Summary of likely benefit flows from the EIZ 
Benefits  Main beneficiaries 
Taxes and fees    All partners have the potential to benefit equally. Benefit flows depend on 
formulas agreed – i.e. open to negotiation (see table 2) 
Land value    Host country(ies)  
Employment    Host country(ies) inevitably stand to gain the most. Dependent on labor 
mobility and degree to which affirmative action on employment is taken. 
  Peripheral regions to benefit from remittances 
Spillovers: infrastructure 
and logistics 
  Host country(ies) / regions around the EIZ to benefit most, but will also 
create improved trade environment for businesses in the periphery, 
particularly if zone developed along a corridor model 
Spillovers: supply links, 
technology, and knowledge 
  Regions in close proximity to EIZ will benefit most, although supply links 
may extend well into the periphery 
  Technology and knowledge spillovers likely to remain in close proximity to 
the core (Crescenzi, Rodriguez-Pose, and Storper, 2007) 
Source: Authors 
 
In  the  remainder  of  this  section  we  outline  a  number  of  potential  approaches  to  overcoming  the 
commitment challenge in the EIZ context, bearing in mind the likely distribution of gains from the EIZ 
outlined in Table 1. They are organized in three broad categories. First, we address commercial and 
financial  mechanisms  that  can  establish  an  effective  incentive  system  from  the  outset,  enabling 
encapsulated trust. Second, we discuss the formal, institutional approaches to ensuring commitment – 
these  are  largely  related  to  legal  constraints  and  enforcement  mechanisms  through  which  to  bind 
parties to commitments (imperative credibility). Finally, we discuss informal approaches to align mutual 
interests  of  stakeholders  (which  can  facilitate  both  imperative  and  motivational  credibility).  These 
approaches are by no means mutually exclusive. Indeed, effectively addressing commitment risks likely 
relies  on  making  use  of  all  three  mechanisms  –  according  to  North  (1990,  p.58):  “Creating  an 
institutional environment that induces credible commitment entails the complex institutional framework 




One of the first ways to align incentives in the zone is through its location. As noted earlier, the most 
appropriate  location  to  serve  international  markets,  from  a  natural  agglomeration  perspective,  is 
probably  on  the  coast,  perhaps  near  a  major  metropolitan  area  like  Mombasa.  By  locating  the 
prospective zone on land encompassing an existing or new port, or along an existing growth corridor, it 
may be possible to benefit from the natural agglomeration forces while also helping to lock in the 
participation of key member states, thus helping to offset some of the political risks and sharing some of 
the benefits. As discussed above, the regions surrounding the EIZ would benefit directly through the 
spillovers of economic activity outside the zone. But the landlocked states, and specifically those regions 
far from the core – who currently face major barriers to participating in international trade as a result of 
inefficiencies and non-tariff barriers at the ports in Mombasa and Dar Es Salaam – would also benefit by 
getting  access  to  a  more  efficient  gateway  through  a  port  and  trade  facilitation  process  operated 16 
 
collectively (or by the EAC) on behalf of all member states. 
 
The next critical step to maintaining commitment of the participating governments is to get the financial 
incentives right over the long-term. As discussed previously, one of the key challenges is to convince the 
host government(s) to give up authority over a part of their territory. Part of the solution to this is 
commercial. The host government(s) may lease the (most likely unused) land to the EIZ for a period – 
probably a minimum of 30-40 years. If the EIZ is implemented successfully, the value of the EIZ land 
should rise substantially. This is a significant asset from which the host government(s) will benefit. Of 
course, this must be balanced against the need to keep land prices low enough to attract developers and 
investors. The increase in land value will not be restricted, however, to the footprint of the EIZ; rather, 




 At the same time it is critical that the realization of this land value not become an incentive for reneging 
at some point in the project. There are likely to be a number of models for achieving this. The first, and 
most obvious, is setting a clear time limitation on the charter agreement, returning the land to the host 
government after a specified date. Even during the period prior to the land returning to the jurisdiction 
of the host(s), it might be possible to establish an agreement whereby the host government(s) is 
compensated for the increase in land value after a certain period of time (e.g. every ten or twenty 
years). Another option is through an incremental purchase agreement on the EIZ land. For example, say 
10,000 hectares was set aside for the EIZ. The host government might  lease 2,000 hectares to the EIZ 
project for the start-up phase, keeping the rest undeveloped. Should the EIZ be sufficiently successful to 
merit  further  development,  land  values  would  presumably  rise  considerably,  allowing  the  host 
government to benefit  from the sale or lease the next tranche. Note that these land -based financial 
mechanisms also offer a way in which the host government can negotiate with regional and local 
governments as well as local communities to garner their commitment to the project.  
 
A more obvious issue is sharing of revenues that arise from the project. This is the main mechanism by 
which the EIZ can help to ensure a “win-win” situation for all EAC members. Managing revenue-sharing 
in the EIZ is likely to be tricky prospect, as the issue is not just one of how to share revenues among EAC 
members,  but  also  about  how  much  and  what  revenue  streams  can  be  retained  by  the  EIZ  itself 
(including its developers and operators) and how much should be reverted back to EAC member states. 
 
The basic principle of the EIZ is that the tax revenues generated from the project would be shared across 
EAC countries – this is to ensure that they all have the fiscal incentive to concentrate SEZ investments in 
the EIZ. So revenue sharing needs to be sufficient to ensure their continued commitment while also 
somehow reflecting the potential unequal investment, risk, or commitment of member governments. In 
                                                           
17 For real estate developers, the growth of the value of the land surrounding major projects is often a major 
source of profit. Developers like Disney (i.e. Disneyland, EuroDisney, etc.) purchase large areas of land that extend 
well beyond their planned development footprint in order to capture as much as possible the land value spillovers 
that accrue from their developments. 17 
 
assessing  how  revenue  allocation might  help  support  credible commitment  it  may  be  necessary to 
separate the different revenue streams that are likely to arise from the EIZ (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Revenue streams in typical SEZ arrangements 
Revenue stream  Description  Typical recipient in SEZ regimes 
Customs revenue  Revenues received from charging 
duties on imports / exports 
National government; note in case of 
existing regional agreements (EAC) there 
may already be a revenue sharing model 
Corporate tax  Taxes of firm profits  National and sometimes state / provincial 
governments (often waived or reduced 
as fiscal incentive) 
Municipal taxes  Taxes charged on profits, assets, 
etc. from local governments 
Local government (often waived or 
reduced as fiscal incentive and to simplify 
tax administration for investors) 
VAT / sales taxes  Taxes on production and sales  National government and sometimes 
state / provincial government (often 
zero-rated or reduced as fiscal incentive) 
Personal income taxes  Taxes on incomes of individuals 
living in zone 
National government 
Service fees  Fees for provisions of licenses for 
operating or carrying out specific 
activities 
SEZ developers; SEZ Authority; individual 
government agencies 
Land / facilities sales 
and lease 
Leases for land plots or rents for 




The selection of how these revenue streams might flow to different stakeholders and the formula by 
which they would be redistributed is a function of commercial and political negotiation, but also must 
take into account the practicalities of revenue generation and collection. Many alternatives are possible. 
In the Chinese SEZs, significant authority as well as financial responsibility was devolved to the zone 
level. They were given legislative power to develop municipal laws and regulations under the basic 
principles  of  national  laws  and  regulations,  which  not  only  included  policies  such  as  labor  market 
regulation (which was transformed in some of the zones), but also in terms of setting and administering 
local taxes, both in terms of structure and level. Thus, strong fiscal devolution was fundamental to 
China’s SEZ development. SEZs were given responsibility for collecting all taxes and were required to 
return  none  or  only  a  small  portion  to  the  national  government  during  the  initial  stages  of  zone 
development. For example, the Shenzhen SEZ was not required to remit taxes to national or provincial 
government during its first decade. In the Aqaba SEZ in Jordan, locally derived revenues – including lease 
income,  license  fees,  and  customs  receipts  –  are  collected  and  retained  by  the  local  authorities 
governing the zone (Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority); while sales tax, excise tax, income tax and 
land and building tax was shared equally between the local authority and the national government (with 
75% of excise and income tax reverting to the national government after 7 years of operation, after 
which the sharing arrangement was to be 50/50). 
 18 
 
In the Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP), the revenue sharing model, however, failed to give the 
appropriate incentives to local government to ensure their commitment (see Box 5). In Aqaba, the 
incentives  were  generally  well  aligned,  but  the  local  authority  found  that  revenue  streams  were 
insufficient to support growth and development in the long-term, and that they had limited flexibility to 
raise additional revenue streams
18. 
 
Box 5: Challenges of partnership alignment in the Singapore-Suzhou industrial zone 
The Singaporean partners focused on using SIP as a platform to transfer developmental experience, and so they 
intended to build SIP infrastructure to international standards, which implied high development costs. By the end 
of 2000, infrastructure investment in the 9 sq km developed at SIP totaled RMB 7.8 billion (US$1.14b), while in the 
other four state-level development zones in Suzhou 50 sq km was developed with an investment of only RMB 6.9 
billion (US$1.01b)
19 – i.e. infrastructure investment in SIP was 6 times more intensive (expensive) than in the other 
parts  of  the  zone.  As  a  result,  the  land  needed  to  be  sold  or  rented  at  a  rate  high  enough  to  recover  this 
development cost.  
 
But for local government, which had only a minor share of the project, the incentives were quite different. They 
cared less about commercial returns more about the social and economic returns including job creation, GDP, and 
perhaps most importantly, tax revenue. In China, local government is responsible for the provision of most public 
goods and services, and its main source of revenue is the value-added tax paid by industrial firms. Thus, the 
incentive for local government is to attract as many industrial investors as possible, as quickly as possible. Land 
rents / prices that are too high to attract industrial investors results in less tax revenue and fewer jobs. Thus, there 
was a clear misalignment of incentives between the Singaporean majority stakeholders and the local government. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that the central government made a commitment in the initial project agreement 
to allow SIP to keep all tax revenues generated in the zone. Thus, local government had no incentive to invest in 
the critical connecting infrastructure to SIP.   
 
Perhaps to the most significant difficulty in the partnership was the fierce competition that arose between SIP and 
neighboring  industrial  parks  promoted  by  the  Chinese  partner.  Before  the  launch  of  SIP  in  1994,  there  were 
already four state-level economic development zones (EDZs) in Suzhou Administration – Suzhou New and Hi-Tech 
Development Zone (located west of the old Suzhou city)
20, Kunshan Economic and Technological Development 
Zone (30km away from SIP), Zhangjiagang Bonded Area (90km from SIP), and Suzhou Taihu National Tourism and 
Vacation Zone – as well as numerous provincial-level EDZs. Most of these zones targeted industrial investors. As 
the other industrial parks were all government sponsored, land developers in those industrial parks were usually 
state  owned  enterprises.  Their  interests  were  naturally  much  more  closely  aligned  with  local  governments. 
Attracting investors, rather than short or medium term commercial returns, were top on their agenda. Industrial 
land  was  therefore  rented  to  industrial  investors  at  subsidized  rate,  creating  serious  competition  for  SIP  and 
making it almost impossible to maintain rents at the levels that could deliver a commercial return. 
 
Moreover, free-riding could hardly be avoided. As SIP is an open area, roads built inside or connecting to SIP could 
also be used by users outside of SIP, including in adjacent industrial zones. At the time SIP attracted interested 
investors with the help of Singapore’s promotion, other industrial parks and neighborhood villages and towns 
watched and learned from SIP, recruited staff who received on-job training in SIP, and even lobbied to attract 
investors away from SIP. The competition with Suzhou New and High-tech Development Zone drew the most 
attention and criticism from Singaporean partners.  
Source: Zhao and Farole (2011) 
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In the case of SIP, the solution was to better align the incentives of the partners to ensure that all 
stakeholders are able to benefit in one way or another SIP’s growth. VAT generated from SIP, which was 
allowed to be kept in SIP initially, was eventually shared between central government, Jiangsu provincial 
government,  Suzhou  municipal  government  and  SIPAC  (the  local  primary  development  and  local 
government  authority  for  the  zone)  –  the  central  government  now  gets  75%,  Jiangsu  provincial 
government 12.5%, Suzhou municipal government 10%, while SIPAC now receives just 2.5%. The main 
tax revenue source for SIPAC is corporate and personal income tax, 60% of which is retained by SIPAC. 
SIPAC is also allowed to keep all revenues from land sales. Finally, the Suzhou New and High Tech 
Development Zone, a major competitor of SIP, took 5% of stake of the main developer in 2005.  In 
Aqaba, the main development company was structured as a 50/50 joint venture between local and 
national  government  in  order  to  ensure  an  effective  tension  was  maintained  between  delivering 
revenues to the fiscus and reinvesting in the SEZ. 
 
Sharing and redistribution of revenue streams from the EIZ would be administratively simplest should 
some fiscal union be formed that would allow for the pooling of revenues under the authority of the 
EAC, with subsequent redistribution through budgetary mechanisms. While this would not remove the 
need for a negotiation process, it would offer the potential to separate negotiations on redistribution of 
EAC revenues from the specific case of the EIZ (e.g. in the case, like in the EU, revenues from the EIZ 
would revert to the EAC common budget and would be pooled with other transfers from customs 
revenues, government contributions, etc.; the debate on redistribution of those revenues would then 
occur  at  a  macro  level). But  in  the  absence  of  a  fiscal  union,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  both  the 
administrative practicalities as well as the political economy concerns of revenue sharing in the EIZ. 
 
The main revenue streams that may be shared among the EAC member states are the corporate taxes, 
the  income  taxes  of  residents,  and  VAT.  While  residents  of  the  EIZ  would  maintain  their  national 
citizenship, a simple model for revenue sharing of income taxes would be to restitute taxes to the 
resident’s home country. Of course, this is almost certain to deliver an imbalance of revenues to the 
host countries as, even assuming fully open labor markets, geographic proximity to the EIZ will. But it is 
likely to be seen by most states as the fairest approach. It could perhaps be combined with some model 
of affirmative action, short of quotas, to promote employment of workers from regions and member 
states outside the core. 
 
The  sharing  of  revenues  from  corporation  tax  is  probably  the  simplest  of  the  various  tax-sharing 
arrangements to manage from an administrative perspective, and one that is likely to be most amenable 
to a negotiated solution (as well as having the greatest potential to be used in a redistributive way). Host 
governments may argue that the location of the EIZ in their country inherently reflects the comparative 
advantages  and  so  ceteris  paribus  most  of  the  investment  would  fall  to  them  anyway.  While  the 
landlocked countries would undoubtedly argue that the EIZ is drawing investors that would otherwise 
have  invested  in  their  country.  There  are  a  number  of  models  that  can  be  used  to  develop  an 
appropriate revenue- sharing formula taking these considerations into account. One option might be to 
restitute tax revenues to the home country of the investors, based on their nationality, with the share of 20 
 
any non-EAC holding being shared equally among member states. Another is to base the formula in part 
on the markets which the companies serve (a kind of “customs union” revenue sharing approach).  
 
VAT revenue sharing would likely be the most complex from an administrative perspective, particularly 
with regard to revenues derived from trade between firms inside the EIZ and those outside it. However, 
from a revenue sharing perspective, it could be treated similarly to corporation tax. 
 
Formal, institutional mechanisms 
Beyond  the  commercial  arrangements,  addressing  the  commitment  challenge  will  require  paying 
considerable attention to the institutions which govern the EIZ. Shepsle (1991) argues there are two 
ways in which commitment can be considered credible. The first is motivational credibility, whereby the 
parties continue to want to honor the commitment at the time of performance. This is essentially a 
model of encapsulated trust (Hardin, 2002) – i.e. parties will benefit equally by compliance and be 
harmed  equally  by  non-compliance.  Such  commitment tends  to  be  self-reinforcing.  However,  in  an 
environment like the EIZ, with a large number of parties, high fixed costs and complex transactions, 
coordination through self-interest-based trust is less likely and risk premiums may rise to unacceptably 
high levels. This leads to the need Shepsle’s second type of credibility – imperative credibility, whereby 
players cannot act otherwise because performance is coerced or their discretion is disabled. This is 
where formal institutions come into play. Most of the literature on credible commitment focuses on the 
importance of institutions, in particular, meta-institutions like property rights and the rule of law, which 
help to establish the incentives that encourage (socially beneficial) commitment (North, 1990; Acemoglu 
and  Robinson,  2006).  Beyond  this,  institutions  facilitate  imperative  credibility  by  ensuring  the 
enforcement of rules rather than simply their existence. This enforcement characteristic is critical to 
aligning incentives, which is why laws must normally be backed up by a strong and impartial judicial 
system (including regulatory bodies, the police, and courts) to interpret and enforce rules (Levy and 
Spiller, 1996).  
 
Levy and Spiller (2006) argue that three conditions are required for credible commitment in high sunk 
cost industries (see Figure 3). First is the existence of substantive restraints on reneging. These should 
have some legal basis. Given that our focus is on restricting the risk of a sovereign state reneging on its 
commitments to the EIZ, it is critical that the legal restraint be in the hands of an independent regulator. 
A  second  condition  is  the  existence  of  high-level  procedural  constraints  limiting  change  in  the 
substantive  constraints.  An  example of  a  procedural  constraint  would  be  a  constitutional  provision 
which places restrictions on the ability of the government of the day to change certain laws or to undo 
the autonomy of the regulator. Finally, commitment requires the existence of credible enforcement of 







Figure 3: Conditions to ensure credible commitment in high sunk-cost industries 
 
Source: derived from Levy and Spiller (2006) 
 
How can these conditions be addressed in practice in the context of the EIZ? A number of traditional 
legal approaches to managing risk in international investments may form part of the solution. First, 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties may play a role in mitigating the risk that any one of the 
member countries of EIZ renege on their commitment to the EIZ (and thus to individual foreign investors 
in the zone). Investment treaties legalize a government’s commitment to fair treatment toward foreign 
investors, requiring among other things national or most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment of in-country 
foreign investors and protection of contractual rights. Such investment treaties are normally enforced 
through  the  provision  of  independent  dispute  resolution  mechanisms.  In  the  context  of  BITs,  the 
theoretical literature suggests that national governments will uphold their commitments out of concern 
to maintain their reputation, both with the bilateral partner and more widely (Goldsmith and Posner, 
2005).  However,  there  is  certainly  no  guarantee  that  BITs  alone  will  ensure  commitment.  Indeed, 
Wellhausen (2010) finds that since the 1990s there has been a huge growth in bilateral investment 
treaties but also a huge growth in the number of “expropriation incidents”
21 and investment arbitration, 
suggesting that even if BITs do contribute to greater investment in the short term, they may not offer a 
solution to the commitment problem.  
 
A second element of the solution may reside in the use of political risk insurance. This can be provided 
through private markets or, for example, through the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). MIGA guarantees can also to a degree be effective in securing a binding commitment 
from governments due to the reputational risk they would expose themselves to should they renege, 
and the implications this might have on their access to finance through the World Bank and other IFIs. 
 
A third element may be the use of international dispute resolution mechanisms, normally involving 
binding arbitration, can play a role in helping to offset such project-related commitment risk. Such 
                                                           
21 “Expropriation incidents” defined as “forced divestment of equity ownership of a foreign direct investor” as per 








mechanisms are normally an important part of political risk insurance schemes. Again, international 
organizations play an important role here – for example the World Bank –hosted International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 
But the most important institutional channel for managing commitment risk will be the structure of 
governance of the EIZ. In this context, international best practice suggests a multi-level structure that 
includes the following components: 
1.  A master developer of the EIZ (responsible for development and operations of the zone), which 
in turn may parcel out sections of the zone as well as infrastructure to subdevelopers; 
2.  An EIZ regulatory authority, which operates as an autonomous governmental agency overseen 
by a Board – the regulatory authority may also act as the local government authority; and 
3.  A national or supranational government that oversees the authority 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the structure that governs the large-scale SEZ in Aqaba. Here the master developer – 
the  Aqaba  Development  Corporation  (ADC)  –  is  a  private  shareholding  company  that  was  initially 
established and remains a 50/50 joint venture between the Government of Jordan and the regulatory 
authority (ASEZA).  ADC is governed by a 6-member board of directors. In the case of the EIZ, the master 
developer  could  also  be  formed  through  some  sort  of  joint  venture  development  corporation 
established  by  member  states.  Alternatively  the  master  developer  could  be  a  completely  private 
company or consortium. Indeed, the original intention with the development of Aqaba was to attract a 
private developer and there remains a plan to eventually shift the ownership to private shareholders. 
 
Figure 4: Aqaba Special Economic Zone Structure 
 






AQABA SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE STRUCTURE
• Independent Government entity that reports directly to the Prime 
Minister
• Is created and vested with its powers by a law
• Sets zone rules and regulations 
• Is managed by a Board of Commissioners (total of 6)
• Provides one-stop shop administrative services (including 
administration of customs and taxes)
• Can vest its authorities to other entities
• Selects, appoints and controls the performance of the private 
developer(s)/operator(s)
• Develop and operate/manage the zone, including infrastructure 
development (excluding all sovereign services)
• Provide efficient utility and other services to zone tenants
• Market the zone in integrated manner to local and international 
investors
• Invest in enabling facilities (e.g. training, labor pool, etc.)
• Recommended to be a single private sector operator/developer to 
achieve critical scale and higher efficiency
• Supervises the work of the Authority









In Aqaba, the regulatory authority (ASEZA) is responsible for establishing rules and regulations within 
the  zone,  providing  all  administrative  services  (including  licensing,  customs,  and  security),  and 
appointing and monitoring the performance of the master developer and any sub-developers. This is a 
fairly standard approach for SEZs. Within Aqaba, ASEZA operates as the municipal authority, not only for 
overseeing the investors in the zone but also its residents. It is managed by a board of directors which 
are  at  the  moment  appointed  by  the  Government  of  Jordan  (note  that  elsewhere  in  the  country 
municipal authorities are elected). Again, this is similar to the approach taken in most SEZs around the 
world,  although  best  practice  is to  ensure  balanced  participation  in the  board  by  key  stakeholders 
including, ideally, a majority from the private sector; wherever possible, board members should be 
elected or at least selected by the membership they represent, rather than being appointed by the 
board chairman or other governmental authority.  
 
The EIZ would most likely establish a regulatory authority with similar responsibilities, but due to its 
regional  nature,  the  board  structure  would  need  to  be  designed  carefully  in  order  to  address  the 
commitment challenge. In this respect three aspects of its composition are likely to be critical. First, of 
course  the  board  must  include  representation  from  all  EAC  states  involved  in  the  project.  Second, 
however, it may be necessary to give the governments of the countries in which the zone is hosted 
some additional power on the board, either through additional representation, their position on the 
board, or perhaps through having veto power over certain decisions. Third, the board should include 
other stakeholders that can play an important role in “checking” the power of the governments and 
ensuring that they maintain their commitment to the project. One important representative group here 
would be an association of all the investors in the project. Another might be a collection of private 
developers. A third important stakeholder group would include representatives of the private sector 
from  the  wider  region  which  will  be  impacted  by  spillovers  from  the  EIZ.  Finally,  including  other 
respected external and neutral parties on the board that have some power to encourage commitment 
can be critical. This may include IFIs or a “third-party” national government, as proposed in the charter 
city model. 
 
Experience from jointly-invested (i.e. government-to-government partnership) SEZ programs suggests 
that setting up a high-level steering council or committee, composed of senior political figures from 
member states, can be a powerful mechanism to encourage commitment. In the example of the China-
Singapore partnership for the Suzhou Industrial Park, the steering committee was co-chaired by the 
Chinese Vice Premier and the Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, and includes ministerial chiefs of the 
two countries, senior officials of Jiangsu provincial and Suzhou municipal governments, and the head of 
Singapore’s Jurong Town Corporation (JTC).  
 
As the EIZ regulatory authority would have jurisdiction and responsibility for delivering all aspects of 
governance  in  the  zone  (e.g.  immigration,  customs,  policing,  licensing,  etc.)  independently  of  the 
national  institutions  of  the  host  country(ies),  it offers  a  significant  opportunity  for  the  EAC  to test 
different configurations of institutions, drawing on good practices from throughout the EAC and indeed 
beyond. Thus, the EIZ may become a model of what effective integration might look like in the EAC. 
Selecting  the  institutional  models  at  the  outset  may  not  be  optimal.  First,  there  is  unlikely  to  be 24 
 
consensus as to which institutions are “best” in any specific domain. Second, even if there are “first-
best” institutional approaches to individual aspects of governing the EIZ, taken together there is no 
guarantee that these institutional forms will work as effectively as some alternative configuration on the 
ground. Thus, one option may be to set up a bidding mechanism for the various governance and public 
service functions inside the zone, with the selection of the preferred bidders made either by the EIZ 
board or (perhaps better) by an independent selection panel consisting of technical experts.  
 
Regional cooperation must be seen not only from its perspective as a commitment risk, but also as an 
important institutional mechanism that can in fact help render more binding the various commitments 
of EAC members. As previously discussed, regional agreements not only raise the prospective payoff 
from cooperation among members, but critically raise the costs of defection. In the context of regional 
cooperation agreements, Laursen (2003) outlines the set of institutional requirements needed to ensure 
commitment of members for different types of issues (see Table 3). In the case of EIZ, the commitment 
challenge is most likely one involving “co-ordination problems with distributional issues”. In general, the 
interest of all member states should be broadly aligned (investment attraction, job creation, etc.) but 
coordination across states may be problematic. Based on this context, Laursen’s model suggests the 
need for pooling and delegation of sovereignty as well as budgetary means to support redistribution, 
possibly in combination with sanctions against defection. How might this be achieved in practice? 
 















































Source: Laursen (2003, p.18); shaded areas by authors identify those most relevant to the commitment issues 
related to the EIZ. 
 
The example of the EU is particularly instructive in identifying some of the institutional mechanisms that 
can play a role in gaining commitment from parties. “Pooling of sovereignty” (Moravcsik, 1998) involves 
member states actually ceding real power over certain issues to regional bodies and accepting binding 
majority decisions. It relies on the primacy of European law over national law and on the existence of 
“commitment institutions” (Laursen, 2003) like the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice, which enforce this primacy. In the EAC, the precedence of national law and the lack of strong 
regional legal authority place significant limitations on the potential for EAC institutions to act as a 
strong, binding force. There may also be limited budgetary means to support redistribution to support 
regions that may have less to gain or could potentially lose from the EIZ (at least in comparison to the EU 
model). However, this could potentially be addressed through the distribution revenue streams (taxes 25 
 
and fees) from the EIZ itself (see discussion earlier in this section). EAC institutions still have the potential 
to play an important role in resolving conflicts between member states over issues related to the EIZ. 
Specifically, mechanisms could be set up so that the EIZ board could raise issues for negotiation or 
arbitration through the EAC Secretariat and ultimately the East African Court of Justice. 
 
Informal mechanisms 
Finally, informal mechanisms can also play a useful role in “checking” the governments which have 
power  over  the  EIZ.  Here,  the  role  of  firm-level  collective  action  is  important.  Where  there  is  an 
organized group of stakeholders that would be affected by any breakdown of commitment on the part 
of host governments, the government is more likely to be kept in check. Wellhausen (2010) shows that 
firm-level collective action against expropriation or nationalization is more likely to occur when the 
foreign investors have things in common, such as nationality, industry of operation, or mode of entry. In 
many SEZ programs (for example in countries like Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Colombia, where 
the programs are dominated by privately operated zones), associations of zone developers form to 
represent the interests of developers. In some programs they are even given a formal seat on the board 
of the zone regulator. In some cases, for example in the Dominican Republic, associations are also 
formed of individual investors inside each industrial zone.  
 
When an existing association does not exist, an alternative is to assemble a “coalition” of interested 
parties who stand to gain from the success of the project and who have a strong incentive to ensure that 
the host governments, and all stakeholders, maintain their commitments. Such a coalition might include 
local governments (that have a stake in the project potential local and foreign investors, labor and 
possibly groups representing residents of the EIZ and of neighboring communities. It might also include 
IFIs and donors who are supporting the EIZ and who have a strong interest in ensuring that the critical 
parties maintain their commitment to the project and do not place it at risk of failure by reneging. While 
such a coalition might have a formal governance role in the EIZ (e.g. on the board, as discussed above) it 
could also play the more informal and independent monitoring role discussed here.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Integration in the EAC offers significant opportunities not only to expand trade among member states, 
but more importantly to scale up regional production to take advantage of much larger global market 
opportunities. Experience of other parts of the world, most notably of East Asia, suggests that regional 
integration is more likely to succeed and to have larger economic benefits if it helps the economies of all 
participating  countries  to  leverage  global  demand.  For  the  EAC,  where  three  out  of  five  member 
countries are land-locked, this is more difficult to accomplish. 
 
In this paper we discussed the proposal for developing an “economic integration zone” in the EAC, a 
special  economic  zone  jointly  governed  by  the  EAC  member  countries  which  would  be  located  in 
proximity both to the coast and to the areas of high concentration of economic activity within the 
region. The benefits of such a zone could be substantial.  It may help to facilitate the integration of 26 
 
regional value chains in support of this scaling up. It would also have the potential to deliver powerful 
demonstration effects on the benefits of integration and to help entrench the integration process.  
 
The  practical challenges  to  implementation  of  this proposal  are  also  substantial  –  in  particular  the 
political economy challenges. The largest of them is the issue of “credible commitment” – the challenge 
of managing the investment risk by maintaining the commitment of the host government(s) and other 
partners over the long term.  
 
The paper offers a number of potential solutions to address these challenges. They include commercial 
and financial mechanisms that can establish an effective incentive system from the outset; formal, 
institutional  approaches  to  ensuring  commitment  such  as  legal  constraints  and  enforcement 
mechanisms; and informal approaches to align mutual interests of stakeholders. Effectively addressing 
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